DraftKings, FanDuel, and the 2015 Schneiderman Fight That Built Modern Sports Betting PR

Originally published November 2015. Updated September 28, 2026.

Part of the Gambling pillar, Sports Betting sub-pillar. Historical anchor: the founding case study for legal sports betting communications in the United States.

On November 10, 2015, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman sent cease-and-desist letters declaring DraftKings and FanDuel illegal gambling operations, and the coordinated crisis response the two companies ran together built the modern template for regulated-category defense communications. DraftKings and FanDuel controlled more than 95% of the U.S. daily fantasy sports market at the time. Both companies retained top-tier crisis counsel, refused to leave the market, and won.

What triggered the 2015 DraftKings and FanDuel crisis?

New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman's cease-and-desist letters declared daily fantasy sports a form of illegal gambling under New York law and ordered both companies to stop accepting bets from New York residents. The letters landed at the peak of a $200 million-plus advertising blitz the two companies had run through the start of the 2015 NFL season. DraftKings brought in Sard Verbinnen & Co, one of the most aggressive strategic-communications firms in the country. FanDuel ran its own crisis operation alongside outside counsel. Both companies filed suit and prepared for a fight.

Why were the stakes bigger than New York revenue?

The Schneiderman action threatened the legal theory the entire daily fantasy industry had been built on: that DFS was a game of skill, not chance, and therefore exempt from the federal Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006. If New York succeeded in declaring DFS illegal gambling, every other state attorney general had a roadmap to do the same. The industry knew this, and the communications response was scaled accordingly.

What was the four-move crisis playbook?

Four moves ran in roughly this order.

Refuse to retreat. Both companies continued operating in New York while litigation proceeded, a posture that required communications support across every news cycle, every court filing, and every state legislator's statement.

Reframe the category. Coordinated public messaging cast DFS as "fantasy sports," explicitly distinguishing it from "gambling," and aligned the industry behind the skill-versus-chance argument. Trade press, business press, and political messaging were re-coordinated around that single frame.

Legislate around the courts. The fight that mattered most was not the New York lawsuit. It was the legislative campaign to pass DFS-specific statutes in as many states as possible before any court could rule the activity illegal. Within 18 months of the Schneiderman cease-and-desist, daily fantasy was explicitly legal under state statute in roughly a dozen states.

Settle and pay. In March 2016, DraftKings and FanDuel agreed to suspend paid contests in New York pending legislation. In August 2016, New York passed an interim DFS law. Both companies eventually paid multimillion-dollar settlements to the New York Attorney General's office.

How did the 2015 fight set up the 2018 sports betting boom?

The Schneiderman fight was the dress rehearsal for a much larger event. The main event arrived in May 2018, when the Supreme Court struck down the federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act in Murphy v. NCAA, clearing the path for states to legalize full sports betting. Within five years, more than 35 states had done so.

DraftKings and FanDuel, having survived the 2015 to 2016 daily fantasy fight, were positioned to capture the resulting market. DraftKings went public via SPAC in April 2020 at a $3.3 billion valuation, climbed past $25 billion at its 2021 peak, and is now the largest U.S.-headquartered sports betting operator. FanDuel was acquired by Flutter Entertainment and operates as the U.S. market share leader.

The 2015 communications fight built the conditions for both outcomes. Without the coordinated industry response to Schneiderman, and without the state-by-state legislative campaign that ran alongside it, neither company would have been positioned to capitalize on PASPA's fall.

Who were the named players in the fight?

• Sard Verbinnen & Co was DraftKings' crisis counsel through the Schneiderman fight, and has continued to represent gaming-sector clients through the post-PASPA expansion.
• Joele Frank, Brunswick Group, Edelman, and BCW Global are the firms that have anchored sports betting and casino sector crisis work through the regulatory cycles of the post-2018 era.
• Eric Schneiderman resigned as New York Attorney General in May 2018 following sexual misconduct allegations. The DFS fight remains one of his most consequential actions in office.
• Jason Robins, DraftKings CEO, and Nigel Eccles, then-FanDuel CEO, were the founders who fronted the public defense of the industry through the crisis.

Why does this case still get taught in crisis PR training?

The 2015 Schneiderman action is now taught in legal-PR and regulatory-comms training as the template for category-defense communications: a new industry, threatened with categorical illegality, that survived by reframing the activity, legislating around the courts, and refusing to leave the market while the fight was running. Every emerging regulated category since, including crypto, cannabis, ride-share, short-term rentals, and AI, has run some version of this playbook.

See also, the modern coverage: Sports Betting Public Relations hub, DraftKings and the Performance Branding Paradox, Five Operators Own the Answer, FanDuel entity, DraftKings entity, Gambling pillar, Crisis Communications.