Ukraine Lobbying in the US: Firms, Spend and FARA Data

Ukraine runs one of the most active but least funded lobbies in Washington, reporting 13,541 political activities in 2021 on about $2 million in FARA payments, according to the Quincy Institute. After the 2022 invasion, 46 firms or individuals registered to represent Ukrainian interests, and Ukrainian clients paid nearly $10.92 million through early 2024, per OpenSecrets data. Much of the work is pro bono, so dollars understate the effort.

Part of EPR's FARA guide and Government Relations and Lobbying section. For the full country ranking, see the Foreign Influence PR Study 2026. Updated October 16, 2026.

How much does Ukraine spend on U.S. lobbying?

Ukraine's disclosed lobbying spend is small next to its activity level, and the total depends on who is counted. The Quincy Institute found that Ukrainian interests spent about $2 million on FARA-registered firms in 2021, against $42 million for Russian interests, of which around $38 million went to Russian state media. Ukrainian clients still reported 13,541 political activities that year, a volume that exceeded even the busiest lobbies in Washington.

Since the invasion, OpenSecrets data showed $10.92 million paid by Ukrainian clients to FARA registrants from 2022 to early 2024, according to Responsible Statecraft. That figure includes nongovernment clients such as companies, foundations and nonprofits. For comparison, the same report put Saudi Arabia's payments to its lobbying and public relations firms above $70 million over the same period. See the Saudi Arabia Lobbying Industry Map and the Qatar Lobbying Industry Map for how Gulf spending compares.

Government-only spending is lower still. Opendatabot, as reported by Ukrainska Pravda, found that Ukraine spent $62,500 on U.S. lobbying services in 2024, down from $366,700 in 2023, and $5.4 million in total since 2022. The same source put Russian state spending at $11.8 million over that period, and $461,200 for Russia in 2024 alone. EPR's own Foreign Influence PR Study 2026 estimates Ukraine's 2024 disclosed total at roughly $8 million to $12 million when all principals are counted, which is a wider net than the government-only figure.

What did Ukraine spend by year?

Ukraine's lobbying spend peaked in the first year of the full-scale war and then fell sharply. The table below separates the figures by what each source measures, because the numbers are not interchangeable.

The gap between $10.92 million and $5.4 million is not an error. OpenSecrets counts every Ukrainian client that paid a FARA registrant, while Opendatabot counts only public funds. Anyone quoting a Ukraine lobbying number should say which one they mean. EPR has not verified a full 2025 total for Ukraine and will update this page when full-year filings are tallied.

Which firms lobby for Ukraine in Washington?

Ukraine's roster mixes paid firms with a large volunteer layer. According to Responsible Statecraft, 11 FARA registrants worked on Ukrainian interests before the war, 46 firms or individuals registered after the invasion, and 18 firms were still registered in February 2024. The table lists firms named in reporting, with the terms that were disclosed.

See the BGR Group firm profile, Mercury Public Affairs and the top lobbying firms directory for the firms behind the roster.

Why is so much Ukraine lobbying done for free?

Many Washington firms took Ukrainian work pro bono after February 2022, and the unpaid layer inflates activity counts while keeping disclosed dollars low. Responsible Statecraft counted 25 pro bono registrants by early 2023, and by early 2024 found that 29 of the 46 firms and individuals registered since the invasion had worked for free. Quincy found that Ukrainian interests reported more than 12,000 political activities in the first two years of the war, mostly contacts with Congress, the executive branch and media. No other foreign client registered under FARA had more work done on its behalf over those two years.

Not every free engagement was substantial. Mercury's filing showed only four emails delivered for its Ukrainian NGO client in the first three and a half months. One firm registered as pro bono counsel to Ukraine's ambassador to the United Nations and deregistered within days after the ambassador said he had no relationship with it. Others did real volume: Yorktown also reported more than 4,000 political activities for the Centre for a European Future, a Belgium-based nonprofit, on top of its Ukrainian clients.

Several of the largest agencies in the world also joined the volunteer effort. Ogilvy, GroupM and Hill & Knowlton Strategies registered to support the Advantage Ukraine initiative, and GroupM's filings described advertising materials for it. For communications professionals, the lesson is that pro bono work for a foreign principal is still FARA work. The disclosure duty does not disappear when the invoice does.

Does pro bono Ukraine lobbying create conflicts of interest?

It can, and reporters have documented the overlap. Responsible Statecraft reported in 2023 that Hogan Lovells, BGR, Mercury, Navigators Global and Ogilvy had all done pro bono work for Ukrainian interests while lobbying for defense contractors. The figures it cited for 2022 include $830,000 from Pentagon contractors to Navigators Global, more than $500,000 to BGR, more than $180,000 to Mercury, and $200,000 each from two contractors to Hogan Lovells. One registrant explained in its own filing that it intended to lobby for more Defense Department spending on equipment contracts that would help Ukraine's military.

That reporting does not allege wrongdoing, and the filings are public. BGR's president told the outlet the firm has no conflict of interest and is proud of its work for Ukraine and its other clients. David Laufman, a former Justice Department official who oversaw FARA enforcement, said he could not recall a comparable surge in pro bono work for any foreign principal. The surge made the disclosure regime harder to read, because free work lowers the dollar figures that trackers rely on and the commercial relationships sit in separate filings. See the DOJ FARA warning to PR firms for why enforcement attention on this area keeps rising.

What did Ukraine's lobby look like before the war?

Before 2022, Ukraine's lobby was built around energy, sanctions and the reputations of its leaders. In 2021, Ukrainian clients reported 13,541 political activities, and Yorktown Solutions was the busiest firm, working for the Ukrainian oil and gas employers federation, according to the Quincy Institute. The push centered on sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and Arent Fox's $1.26 million contract in July 2021 belonged to the same effort. After the invasion, Yorktown said publicly that its focus shifted from energy security to security assistance.

Earlier history includes two cautionary cases. In 2012, the law firm Skadden produced a report defending the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, hired by Paul Manafort on behalf of the Yanukovych government. The Justice Department announced in 2019 that Skadden would retroactively register under FARA after admitting it acted as an agent of the Ukrainian government. The department said the firm had received multiple inquiries from its FARA unit in 2012 and 2013, and that a partner made false and misleading statements that led officials to conclude registration was not required. That case still shapes how law firms handle foreign-government reports.

In 2019, Zelensky's campaign denied hiring a Washington lobbying firm. Signal Group Consulting then filed a disclosure showing about $60,000 for work to elevate his profile between April 3 and May 21, paid through an American attorney named Marcus Cohen. Cohen told RFE/RL he paid for the work himself out of good will. The episode showed how a third party can create a FARA record that the principal itself disowns.

How did 2025 change Ukraine's lobbying approach?

The 2025 minerals negotiation moved Ukraine from volunteer advocacy toward paid legal and trade counsel. Ukraine's Ministry of Justice engaged Hogan Lovells US on April 8, 2025, and the registration was filed with the Justice Department the next day, according to Legal Cheek. The firm was to advise on international trade and U.S. policy issues tied to a deal that the Trump administration framed as a way to recoup the value of U.S. aid. Partners Deen Kaplan and Adam Kushner were reported to bill $1,500 an hour.

The engagement matters for three reasons. First, it was a government client paying market rates, which contrasts with the free work of 2022 and 2023. Second, the same firm had worked pro bono for a Pinchuk foundation in 2023, so the relationship evolved from volunteer to retained. Third, the work was legal and trade counsel rather than traditional lobbying, which shows why FARA tallies based on lobbying categories can miss the work that moves outcomes. The 2025 shift is also why government-only spending figures for 2024 may understate the 2025 picture.

Are Ukrainian regions and companies lobbying too?

Yes, and the client base is wider than the national government. TASS reported in 2025 that the Lviv regional authority agreed with Color Nine Group to represent it in the United States, with a notice appearing on the FARA registry in January 2025. TASS described it as the first time in 33 years that an individual Ukrainian region contracted lobbying services independently of Kyiv, and noted that the firm would act free of charge. That reporting comes from a Russian state outlet, so treat the framing with caution, but the registry entry is a public record that can be checked.

TASS also reported that 179 Ukrainian clients have ever registered in the FARA database, a mix of businesses, public organizations, political parties, politicians and government agencies. That breadth is why one headline number rarely describes the whole Ukrainian effort. Energy employers federations, oligarch-backed foundations, volunteer nonprofits and ministries all appear in the record, often with different registrants and different disclosure patterns.

How does Ukraine's lobby compare with Russia and others?

Ukraine outperforms Russia on contacts and trails it on spending. Before the war, Russian interests outspent Ukraine $42 million to $2 million in 2021, though most of that sum funded state media. After the invasion, U.S. firms cut ties with Russian clients. Axios reported that seven U.S. lobbying and PR firms had parted ways with 10 clients within days of the sanctions announcements. Mercury was among the firms that dropped Russian clients and then took Ukrainian work pro bono.

Among allies, Opendatabot found that Poland cut its U.S. lobbying spend fivefold to $245,200 in 2024, while Russia reduced its state financing by a factor of 18 to $461,200. Ukraine's $62,500 was the lowest of the three. The comparison shows a general retreat in government-funded lobbying across the region, even as the policy stakes stayed high. EPR's Foreign Influence PR Study 2026 ranks Ukraine ninth among the ten markets it tracks, with a post-2022 spike. For other country views, see the UAE Lobbying Industry Map and the Israel FARA PR firms guide.

What advocacy happens outside FARA?

A large share of Ukraine's Washington influence is U.S.-citizen civic activity that does not appear in FARA filings. The diaspora layer includes Razom for Ukraine, founded in 2014, and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, founded in 1940. These groups mobilize constituents, donors and local media in ways that no registered firm can. Their audience overlaps heavily with Congressional offices, which is why the formal lobbying numbers understate total influence.

The distinction matters for readers of filings. A FARA registrant acts at the direction or request of a foreign principal. A diaspora organization run by American citizens acting on their own account generally does not. EPR's country hub, Ukraine's Information War, covers the communications side of that wider ecosystem, including how the government and civic groups present the war to international audiences.

How do you track Ukraine's lobbying filings?

Ukraine's lobbying shows up in several disclosure systems, and the spend figures differ by what each counts. Check them together before quoting a number.

• FARA registration statements and exhibits show who hired the firm, the fee, the scope and any pro bono arrangement. The Hogan Lovells filing is a good example of how a rate and a team appear in the exhibit.
• FARA supplemental statements list political activities and are filed every six months, so recent activity lags by months.
• Lobbying Disclosure Act reports cover domestic issue lobbying by the same firms, including the defense clients discussed above.
• Aggregators such as OpenSecrets and Opendatabot count different clients, which is why $10.92 million and $5.4 million can both be cited for the period since 2022.

Search the Justice Department's FARA eFile database by country and by registrant, and read the exhibits rather than the headlines. Figures on this page come from sources published between 2019 and 2025, and the most recent totals cover 2024. For the statute itself, read What FARA Requires in 2026.

What should communications firms learn from Ukraine's lobby?

Ukraine's record gives agencies four practical lessons on foreign-principal work. Each comes from a documented episode above rather than from theory.

• Pro bono is not exempt. Free work for a foreign government or its affiliates still triggers registration and activity reporting.
• Intermediaries create records. The 2019 Signal Group filing shows that a third party can put a principal's name on a FARA form without the principal's approval.
• Report scope matters. Skadden's 2012 Tymoshenko report became a registration case seven years later because it was part of a public relations campaign.
• Your other clients are public. Readers of a Ukrainian filing can check whether the registrant also represents defense contractors or former adversaries.

For how FARA rules reach smaller agencies, see state-level baby FARA laws for PR firms, and for a recent filing chain, see Litigation PR Under FARA.

What should you watch next in Ukraine's Washington effort?

The next phase is likely to be about reconstruction, trade and security guarantees rather than emergency aid. The 2025 minerals negotiation already showed Kyiv paying for U.S. counsel on economic terms. Watch for new government registrations, any return of the volunteer firms to paid work, filings tied to reconstruction financing, and updated Opendatabot and OpenSecrets totals for 2025 and 2026. A rise in government spend would reverse the 2023 and 2024 decline and would signal that Kyiv sees paid representation as necessary again.

Also watch the pro bono roster. Firms that registered in 2022 and have since deregistered or gone quiet tell their own story about how long volunteer advocacy lasts. Filings that show activity counts without dollars, or dollars without activity, deserve a closer look at the exhibits behind them.

Sources: Quincy Institute, The Lobbying Battle Before the War (2022); Responsible Statecraft, The Ukraine lobby two years into war (2024); Responsible Statecraft, pro bono Ukraine lobbyists (2023); The American Conservative (2022); Axios (February and March 2022); RFE/RL (April and August 2019); The Hill, Skadden FARA registration (2019); Legal Cheek on Hogan Lovells (April 2025); TASS on Color Nine Group (2025); Opendatabot via Ukrainska Pravda (April 2025); EPR Foreign Influence PR Study 2026. Figures are disclosed FARA data and may be revised.